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"These changes will sound the death knell for citizen groups." The remark was 
perhaps the only point of agreement between Minneapolis community activists and several 
members of a city council pushing hard to prune back what they saw as an overgrown 
system of government-sponsored citizen participation. 
Did the resulting "reforms" indeed signal the end of the "backyard r~volution" (Boyte 
1980), with the defeat of community groups at the hands of local elected officials? Or, 
was this only one of many skirmishes? And, in either case, what insights into the future 
of citizen participation in other cities might the Minneapolis experience provide? 
This paper seeks to address such issues by exploring the extent to which involvement 
by citizen groups in Minneapolis community development politics can be said to be 
"institutionalized," or incorporated into routine policy processes. If community 
organizations are part of "politics as usual," one might expect the impact of, say, a hostile 
city council to be less devastating than if the groups occupied more tenuous, less 
legitimate positions. Considered as well is the significance of such inclusion, directing 
attention to the mechanisms for and consequences of participation. 
The first section of the paper sets out criteria for assessing the degree and nature of 
institutionalization. A discussion of the design and focus of the study follows. Then, 
after a brief introduction to the arena of community development policy, the current 
status and recent evolution of organized citizen participation in Minneapolis are 
examined. The results are decidedly mixed. While community involvement has become a 
routine part of development politics, groups have had, at best, marginal impact on policy 
outcomes. Still, organizations not only survived a period of threat, but both broadened 
their range of contacts with local actors and expanded their strategic repertoires. 
Underscored are both the possibilities for and limitations of efforts to incorporate 
citizen input into routine politics. And, as the concluding section suggests, these findings 
have implications for the character and impact of organized citizen participation, not 
only in Minneapolis but in U.S. cities in general. 
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
Once it has tasted success, an organization typically becomes concerned with 
sustaining its activities. For a citizen group, this may involve pressing to keep particular 
issues on the public agenda, to steer government decisions, to forge or continue links with 
relevant government officials, and, not incidentally, to maintain itself. From the vantage 
point of the relevant political system (for example, the city) or policy arena (for example, 
community development), it is possible to speak of the extent to which such groups play 
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institutionalized roles (see, for example, Huntington 1968, Parsons 1954, Polsby 1969). 
One might examine, for example, the degree of regularized participation of citizens· in 
policy-making and the level of acceptance or legitimacy accorded to such involvement by 
other actors. Important, too, would be the ability of citizen organizations to survive over 
time and to adapt to change. Also critical would be the nature of such institutionalized 
roles. One would want to know at what points (planning, adoption, implementation, 
evaluation) in which fashion (as consultants, veto groups, deliverers of services) and with 
what effects citizen organizations were incorporated into the structures and processes of 
decision-making. 
Quite clearly, institutionalization of citizen involvement in local politics need not 
be an untarnished good from the perspective of other claimants, governmental actors or 
the polity. Civil rights groups may perceive the growing activism of community 
organizations to be diverting public attention and resources from their concerns. Elected 
officials often resist what they see as the exploding volume and increasingly 
irreconcilable demands placed upon them by community groups, while bureaucrats 
concentrating on attaining "technical rationality" complain that citizen involvement 
reduces program efficiency and effectiveness. And, on the one hand, democratic theorists 
and citizens alike insist on opening access to the political system to all who desire to 
participate. Yet, increased involvement may slow or even stymie governmental action, 
fostering "street fighting pluralism" (Yates 1978), neighborhood autarky, or "beggar thy 
neighbor" orientations. Moreover, institutionalized participation by organizations may 
make it harder for other groups to gain access in the future, as the newest actors come to 
share an interest in maintaining the ,boundaries of the system (Lowi 1979-the "Peachum 
factor"). 
Regardless of the normative interpretation, however, the level and nature of 
institutionalized involvement are key to an understanding of the roles and impact of 
citizen groups in local politics. Tryese groups have featured prominently in the urban 
landscape for at least two decades. And, they have been the subject of often acrimonious 
debate at all levels of government. Today, community groups are painted as increasingly 
beleaguered, confronted with the elimination of some federal requirements for citizen 
participation and reductions in available local, state and federal monies. At the same 
time, in many cities, groups are becoming involved in the coproduction of services. Still 
open for .exploration, then, are both the staying power of citizen organizations and the 
range of roles they can be expected to perform. 
Here, these issues are addressed through an examination of several aspects of the 
institutionalization of citizen participation in Minneapolis. Considered first is the 
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minimal requirement for institutionalization--survival. Following major changes in the 
structure and funding of organized citizen participation, how many and which types of 
groups persisted, disappeared and emerged? Second, given survival, one can look at the 
range and degree of use of regularized channels for input into local policy processes. Of 
interest are the existence, strength and character of the relationships linking community 
groups with council members, the mayor and bureaucrats. Perhaps most important, 
though, is the level of governmental responsiveness to the demands of citizen 
organizations. Are the links merely window-dressing, reducing involvement to "pseudo-
participation" (Pateman 1970) or 11formal cooptation" (Selznick 1966)? Or, is there 
discernible citizen influence over policy decisions? 
In the course of the analysis, it will be important to recall, as well, that not all 
citizen organizations are alike. The problems their neighborhoods confront often vary 
dramatically as do the interests and demands of residents, and resources like time, 
energy, money and political knowledge and skills. Nor, not surprisingly, are these 
differences distributed randomly. Lower income neighborhoods with the greatest needs 
may find it more difficult to mobilize and maintain organizations as well as to exercise 
effective influence over city officials (O'Brien 197 5, for example). Raised, in turn, is the 
issue of the inclusiveness of whatever mode of citizen participation becomes routine in a 
city. To complete the picture of institutionalized activity, one must consider whether 
involvement by citizen groups serves as an alternative channel for input that would not 
otherwise reach city officials or whether it tends to reinforce the advantages of certain 
residents. 
STUDYING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN MINNEAPOLIS 
These three aspects of institutionalization and the crosscutting issue of 
inclusiveness structure the discussion of organized participation in Minneapolis. Limiting 
examination to one city immediately raises the question of generalizability. While one 
must view the findings of any case study with caution, Minneapolis appears to be a 
favorable setting for assessing the significance of community groups. The city often has 
been hailed as an exemplar of citizen involvement (Boyte 1980, Henig 1982 and Kotler 
1969). If community organizations are weakening or have little evident impact in such an 
environment, they are not likely to wield much influence under less favorable 
circumstances. To the extent groups~ important, both a standard for co.mparison and 
contrast is set, and important variables contributing to that success may be identified for 
exploration elsewhere. In addition, of course, focusing upon one city permits more 
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intensive analysis. It allows one to "get a feel for" the texture and dynamics of local 
politics and to track change processes more closely. 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY 
This paper examines organized citizen participation in community development 
politics in Minneapolis from 1980 to the present. As detailed below, this has been a period 
of controversy and flux. 
Concentration on the arena of housing and economic development in part reflects 
the major concerns of community groups in many cities, and certainly those in 
Minneapolis. Moreover, (Gittell 1980, p. 49} argues that these "community development" 
organizations are the "most viable" citizen groups. If they are found to be fragile or 
weakening, then the prospects for other sorts of citizen organizations (those dealing with, 
for example, schools or police departments) may be expected to be even bleaker. In 
contrast, indication of at least limited success may suggest fruitful pathways for these 
other groups. 
The data for the analysis come primarily from mail questionnaires sent to citizen 
groups during the summers of 1980 and 1983 ( 117 were sent in 1980 and 83 in 1983, with 
response rates of approximately .59 percent in both cases), and from semi-structured 
interviews with city officials and community leaders (fourteen in 1980 and seventeen in 
1983). These sources are supplemented by materials garnered from public hearings and 
meetings, documents and news reports. (Further details are provided in the appendix). 
Since citizen organizations, officials and development structures and procedures changed 
over the period, the data do not permit comparison on a group-by-group or individual-by-
individual basis. Still, they do allow one to get a sense of the evolution of organized 
citizen participation over the four years. 
THE SETTING 
By 1980, citizen organizations crowded the Minneapolis political terrain. An active 
"natural system" of community organizations (Minneapolis City Coordinator 1982) 
included groups more than a decade old. Federal requirements added to the number of 
groups, mandating the creation of project area committees and neighborhood strategy 
area committees. In 1976, the city established eleven planning district citizen advisory 
committees (PDCACs) to channel input into the allocation of Community Development 
Block Grants monies and the formulation and implementation of various city and 
community plans. PDCACs also elected representatives to the city-wide Capital Long-
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Range Improvements Committee (CUC) which recommended priorities for capital 
improvement projects to the city council. 
Few found the formal advisory process completely satisfactory. As will be 
elaborated later, the 1980 mail questionnaire revealed significant discontent. " [The 
procesfil is a paper ideal," replete with "double talk, red tape and looph~les," leading to 
"frustration" and "disillusionment." Council members complained about the proliferating 
demands on their time and energy. The council president created an uproar by 
commenting: "Real citizen participation comes once every two years, on election day" 
(Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 24 March 1982; her emphasis). 
The growing dissatisfaction coincided with three other factors that arguably served 
to produce significant changes in organized citizen involvement. First, HUD loosened 
some of its requirements for citizen participation and eliminated neighborhood strategy 
areas (NSAs). Second, like many cities, Minneapolis faced revenue shortages in the early 
1980s, as federal and state aid dropped and property tax receipts dwindled. Third, after 
several years of debate about the performance of the city's three economic development 
units (the Housing and Redevelopment Authority, the Industrial Development Commission, 
and the Economic Development Division of the City Coordinator's Office), they were 
joined in 1981 to form the Minneapolis Community Development Agency (MCDA). 
Following federal action, the city council in 1982 stopped funding NSA committees 
and the Neighborhood Services Generalists in the MCDA who staffed the groups. Also 
dismantled was the formal process involving the planning district citizen advisory 
committees. Instead, groups desiring to be consulted by the city when a proposed project 
affected their neighborhood were directed to register with the new Center for Citizen 
Participation and Communication. Neighborhood appointments to CUC were cut in half. 
Eliminated, too, were the positions of the community planners who assisted the PDCACs. 
And, the council slashed the budget for citizen participation activities within MCDA 
(which like one of its predecessors, the Housing and Redevelopment Authority, used the 
funds mainly to staff citizen groups) from $300,000 in fiscal 1982 to $62,000 the following 
year. This triggered a mayoral veto which the council promptly overrode, despite loud 
citizen outcry. Moreover, council members stressed allocating funds according to the 
merits of proposed neighborhood projects. In effect, groups were to enter into 
"performance contracts" with the city, agreeing to use public monies to engage in clearly 
specified activities and to be held accountable for producing particular results. In 
general, council members justified the shift by contending that direct neighborhood 
funding was inequitable since all organizations did not receive money, that the monies 
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frequently were used to mount attacks on city hall, and that revenue shortages dictated 
many of the cuts (interviews). 
Creation of the M CDA produced still other changes. Established in 1981, the new 
agency undertook an internal reorganization in early 1982. Eliminated was the 
Neighborhood Services Division of the former Housing and Redevelop~ent Authority 
(MHRA), the main source of information and staff assistance for community groups, 
particularly those in lower income areas. As already noted, staff help largely 
disappeared, while the liaison function was transferred to the Agency Relations Office. In 
addition, two of MHRA's three neighborhood offices were closed, with a corresponding 
staff reduction from nineteen to four. 
Throughout the period, citizen participation remained a volatile issue. By fall 1983, 
as city council elections approached, some council members joined with Mayor Fraser and 
MCDA to push for increased money for citizen groups. This time, they were successful; 
effective June 1, 1984, funding will be boosted to $300,425. Meanwhile, the elections 
produced five new council members, all of whom received support from neighborhood 
activists in their wards. 
FINDINGS: INSTITUTIONALIZING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
The implications of these changes for the nature and consequences of community 
involvement may be examined using the analytical categories introduced earlier. 
GROUP SURVIVAL 
Following groups through time can be more difficult than it might seem initially. 
Ad hoc organizations may emerge to join the public debate on a particular issue (a school 
closing, regulation of pornography) and then disband. Others turn out to be merely 
"paper" organizations. 
In Minneapolis, registration of organizations desiring information about city 
activities provides a rough indicator of the number of community organizations. In June 
1980, the planning department listed 117 such groups. By June 1983, the list compiled by 
the Center for Citizen Participation and Communication contained eighty-three 
organizations. The differences are largely accounted for by the dissolution of government 
mandates for thirty groups. None of the nineteen NSA committees functioned after 1982. 
However, seven of the eleven PDCACs continued to function despite severed "official" 
ties to the city government. The survivors tended to be the more active of the planning 
district bodies, located throughout the city in areas with varying per capita income. In 
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northeast Minneapolis, for example, the PDCAC assumed nearly all of the responsibility 
for linking the community with city government; other organizations concentrated efforts 
on more "neighborhood-focused" activities. In contrast, the PDCACs that ceased 
operating were in communities with other, more prominent citizen organizations. 
The changes of the early 1980s had no major impact on the number or range of 
citizen groups. Organizations in blighted neighborhoods that had been tagged "strategy 
areas" lost staff assistance and mission and faded away. In nearly all instances, though, 
members of the NSA committees had been selected from groups serving a larger area, so 
some organizational mechanisms remained (albeit with reduced funding). Moreover, 
PDCACs remained in operation when there were no alternative organizations and 
disappeared when there were. Overall, then, citizen groups meet the de minimis test for 
institutionalization: survival. 
REGULARIZED CHANNELS FOR PARTICIPATION 
Yet, mere survival reveals little about the routineness or character of participation. 
Several possible avenues for involvement are discussed next. First, regularized inclusion 
of citizen groups is explored in light of the abandonment of much of the formal advisory 
process. Then, neighborhood participation in the sphere of development policy is 
examined more closely and organizational links with bureaucrats and elected officials 
assessed. Lastly, cooperation across neighborhood boundaries is mentioned as an 
emergent form of citizen involvement. 
The Formal Advisory Process: Loss or Draw? 
Dismantling the PDCACs may appear to have been a major blow to organized 
citizen participation. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that the formal advisory process 
was never viewed as particularly valuable. 
The 1980 mail survey asked respondents to describe the primary "benefits or 
advantages" of the process as well as its "main problems or disadvantages." Forty-five 
groups reported fifty-three benefits. As Table 1 indicates, the majority of the groups (52 
percent) considered the process useful as a means of interjecting citizen opinion into city 
decision-making. The PDCACs, according to this view, were "forums" for "common 
person input." They "legitimized" citizen involvement. As the official group in the 
community, the PDCAC also communicated important information to city officials, 
especially in response to the initiatives of local government. Of particular note, however, 
is t~at, except for the groups listing distribution of funds as a benefit, increased 
information flows and improved communication, not concrete outcomes, were described 
as the chief advantages. 
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TABLE I. BENEFITS OF THE FORMAL ADVISORY PROCESS 
"What, if any, do you see as the primary benefits or disadvantages of the formal citizen 
advisory process?" 
Benefit 
Serve as a means of citizen input 
Provides a flow of information between PDCACs and the city 
Promotes communication between PDCACs and neighborhood groups 
Allocates funds 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1980. 
Percent of 
Groups 
Reporting 
52.0 
10 .1 
8.7 
5.8 
More varied and more strongly stated were statements of the problems with the 
advisory process. Forty-seven organizations mentioned sixty-four negative points 
(reported in Table 2). The most frequent criticism (made by almost one-third of the 
respondents) was that few tangible results had been obtained because the PDCACs lacked 
real power. Participants had only the "illusion that they are making decisions." Indeed, 
one respondent argued that the process "diluted true citizen involvement by channeling 
too much energy into a process that is not very powerful." PDCAC recommendations 
frequently were "ignored" by "dependent, city-funded staff," making the process "not 
worth the bother." Others complained that PDCACs were "unrepresentative." Several 
respondents claimed the organizations were not "reflective of the community groups that 
exist" and that the creation of PDCACs relegated "private neighborhood groups and their 
concerns to second class status." 
Overall, most groups were highly critical of the formal advisory mechanism. Lack 
of satisfaction surfaced again in public hearings on restructuring formal citizen 
participation (3 March 1982). Elected officials tended to agree, though for different 
reasons. They argued that PDCACs failed to adequately represent communities whose 
residents ·were the officials' "real constituents" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 
1983, Minneapolis Tribune 17 August 1981, interviews). 
-8-
TABLE 2. PROBLEMS 'WITH THE FORMAL CITIZEN ADVISORY PROCESS 
"What, if any, are the main problems or disadvantages of the formal citizen advisory 
process?" 
Problem 
Few benefits or concrete results 
Unrepresentativeness of PDCACs 
Insufficient resources 
Low citizen commitment to the process 
Lack of citizen knowledge of the policy issues PDCACs deal with 
Factionalism on the PDCACs 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1980. 
Percent of 
Groups 
Reporting 
30.0 
21. 7 
18.8 
10 .1 
7.3 
4.4 
Nor has reduced neighborhood representation on the Capital Long Range 
Improvements Committee provoked significant outcry. "CLIC has been, and remains, a 
sandbox in which citizens are allowed to play" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 
1983, community p. 2). 
Thus, while citizens have lost one channel of input into the policy-making arena, it 
is not clear it was ever an especially popular or useful one. Indeed, to the extent PDCACs 
served to siphon off activists and resources from other citizen groups, their disappearance 
in some areas ultimately may enhance the level and perhaps the consequences of 
organized activity. 
Development Politics 
Perhaps instead, important citizen activity can be discovered where most 
governmental attention has been directed: the arena of housing and economic 
development. Minneapolis is involved in a host of "community development" activities, 
ranging from construction and management of public housing units to subsidization of 
below-market rate loans for moderate income housing to rehabilitation and resale of 
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homes to small business assistance and neighborhood economic development to the 
issuance of industrial revenue bonds and provision of tax increment financing for larger 
scale business development. Development is a "high stakes" policy sphere, characterized 
by high salience and considerable controversy over priorities. Not only have citizen 
organizations sought doggedly to exercise influence in this arena, many o~ the changes in 
the 1980-1982 period were aimed at shaping the extent and character of such access. 
Formal procedures for approving and executing city-assisted development projects 
are studded with guarantees of citizen participation. State legislation enabling 
Minneapolis to reorganize its development agencies mandated that community groups be 
involved in all stages of activity, "including policy establishment and implementation, 
assessment of performance and policy amendment" (Chapter 595, Laws of Minnesota for 
1980, pp. 1105-1113). The ordinance creating MCDA devoted an entire section to citizen 
participation; it directed that organizations be given "adequate opportunity to participate 
in an advisory role in planning and implementing projects and programs" (Minneapolis City 
Council 81-Or-017, 16 January 1981). And, amendments directed at streamlining 
development procedures and strengthening council control of development highlighted 
consultation with community groups throughout the life of a project {Ibid., 11 February 
1983). 
The extent to which these goals are being attained is less clear. Many groups 
complain that cuts in staff and funding prevent them from taking meaningful part in 
discussions of particular projects. As importantly, they contend, loss of the technical 
assistance of community planners and neighborhood-based city staffers deprive them of 
the capacity to formulate feasible projects of their own. MCDA officials and board 
members tend to side with the organizations, but members of the city council insist that 
possibilities for citizen involvement increased with the "streamlining" and coordination of 
development procedures (interviews). 
One can better assess these divergent claims by examining the evolution of the links 
between citizen groups and government actors in development politics. 
The Bureaucratic Connection: Citizen Groups and MCDA 
Relations be.tween community organizations and local agencies date at least to the 
days of the Community Action Program and Model Cities. Links became considerably 
more cooperative over time as groups developed ties with the Planning Department and 
Housing and Redevelopment Authority (MHRA). By 1980, community planners maintained 
that "agency staff are starting to ask what neighborhoods think and to involve them in 
policy." And, representatives of citizen groups spoke highly of the assistance they 
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received from "their" planners. Meanwhile, more than two-thirds of the organizations 
surveyed reported "cooperative" links with MHRA and described a range of joint 
activities. 
Thus, citizen groups reacted to the termination of the community planners and, to a 
lesser extent, the merger establishing MCDA with anger and dismay. Co~munity groups, 
the HRA board of commissioners and top staffers objected loudly to the reorganization 
(interviews; Mayor's Task Force, minutes, 1980). Community activists feared diminution 
of MHRA's concern with citizen involvement. Neither of the other agencies to be merged 
had citizen participation requirements, and both were perceived to be particularly 
responsive to downtown business interests. And, some worried that economic 
development activities would take precedence over housing programs. Moreover, the 
consolidation reduced the independence of the MHRA board, bringing the new agency into 
the city's budget process and allowing the mayor and council to appoint not only board 
members but "special designees." Given mounting council hostility, citizen groups were 
especially wary. 
More difficult to assess is to what extent these fears have been realized. Early on, 
discontent was evident. The MCDA board selected an executive director who was not a 
resident of the city and who had "no known neighborhood record," without public hearings 
or any systematic effort to solicit the advice of community groups. And, the transition 
team for the new agency dropped citizen participation from the agenda of its planning 
meetings. 
As time passed, however, the record becomes more mixed. The executive director, 
James Heltzer, drew considerable criticism for closing MHRA's neighborhood offices and 
centralizing activities in a "shiny new downtown office building" to which neighborhood 
residents "are uncomfortable going." Yet, Heltzer also received favorable comments as 
"hardworking, honest •.. a vast improvement." And, he publicly advocated increasing links 
between the agency and community groups and supported restoration of funding for 
citizen participation (interviews; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983, community 
p. 3). 
Nor was there agreement on whether the 1980-82 changes led to a loosening of ties 
between MCDA and citizen groups. Some agency board members and community activists 
insisted links had attenuated. "Communication has dropped considerably. We have no 
MCDA representative attending our meetings and no funding ••• " (mail questionnaire). 
Yet, agency staffers and representatives of other groups disagreed. Responding to the 
mail survey, organizations reported sixteen instances of increased contact since the 
creation of MCDA, seventeen of decreased contact, and twenty-two of no change (see 
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Table 3). Similarly, as Table 4 suggests, groups could not agree whether the flow of 
information from the agency had risen or declined. However, groups in "inner city" 
communities were more likely to perceive a decline in contact (asymmetric lambda= .06, 
asymmetric uncertainty coefficient = .I 1)1 and information (asymmetric lambda = .22, 
asymmetric uncertainty = .2.5), no doubt reflecting the cuts in city fundin~ which affected 
organizations in poorer areas most. 
TABLE 3. CONTACT WITH CITY DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES BEFORE AND 
AFTER MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP 
"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's 
contact with a city development agency?" 
All Predecessor Agencies MHRA 
All Neighborhood All Neighborhood 
Contact Groups Groups Groups Groups 
Increased since merger 16 4 10 4 
, Decreased 17 6 8 3 
Remained the same 22 10 12 8 
x2 1 .13.5 2.8 .8 2.8 
x2 is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the 
equiprobable distribution. Variations in distribution are not significant here. 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983. 
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TABLE 4. FLOW OF INFORMATION TO CITIZEN GROUPS BEFORE AND 
AFTER MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP 
"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in the amount of information 
your organization receives from city development agencies?" 
All Predecessor Agencies MHRA 
All Neighborhood All Neighborhood 
Amount of Information Groups Groups Groups Groups 
Increased since merger 19 9 11 7 
Decreased 14 7 9 5 
Remained the same 18 4 9 3 
x2 
.825 1.9 .28 1.6 
x2 is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the 
equiprobable distribution. Variations in distribution are not significant here. 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983. 
Meanwhile, the range of links expanded somewhat. Citizen participation 
requirements were applied for the first time to the economic development activities of 
the former Industrial Development Commission and the Economic Development Division 
of the City Coordinator's Office. And, neighborhood economic development--focusing on 
smaller commercial districts serving geographically limited areas-emerged as a new 
focus for the agency. Yet, citizen groups did not always respond vigorously to the new 
opportunities. An agency official observed: 
[TJhe primary interest of neighborhood groups is still in housing. If you go to 
elections at neighborhood meetings, you'll find they rarely want to be on 
economic development committees .•. The city staff doing industrial projects 
have groups review each of the developments before they do it ... Yet, 
normally, they're just not that interested (interview 6 September 1983). 
And, a council member criticized the low quality of proposals for neighborhood economic 
development funds (interview 12 September 1983). Neighborhood activists retort that the 
dearth of technical assistance limits their ability to design projects. 
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The nature of the ties have changed in another way as well. In the past, community 
groups received funds from MCDA and then determined uses for the money. According to 
the notion of performance contracting, in contrast, organizations must submit specific 
proposals for funding. Likely involved is a move toward increased agency control, a shift 
from "political" decentralization to "administrative" decentralization (Yatt:s 1973). 
Despite the mixed evaluations of the strength of the links between citizen groups 
and MCDA, more consensus appeared on the overall assessment of participation 
procedures. The 1983 mail questionnaire asked groups whether their satisfaction with the 
procedures had increased, decreased or remained the same following the merger. Table 5 
shows that, among the organizations that reported links with MHRA (the only predecessor 
agency requiring citizen participation), most were less satisfied following consolidation. 
Organizations throughout Minneapolis shared this view, although those from poorer areas 
were slightly more likely to report dissatisfaction (asymmetric lambda = .1, asymmetric 
uncertainty = .22). Indeed, when given the opportunity to respond to an open-ended 
question on the disadvantages of the merger, fifteen of the forty-one responses (and half 
of those from inner city organizations) had to do with a decrease in citizen input. One 
respondent noted flatly: "Citizen participation has all but disappeared." No group listed 
enhanced involvement as an "advantage or benefit" of the merger. 
An MCDA board member concurred with these evaluations. 
A lot of our fears about citizen participation have come to be realized ..• The 
board and agency are a lot less accessible. They closed the neighborhood 
offices. The perception On the neighborhoodiJ is that the access is not there •.. 
Now the agency is in a hard to find place, and all the doors are locked 
(interview 26 August 1983). 
And, an M CDA official conceded: "}9roupfJ don't trust us. We're caught in the crossfire 
between groups and the council on citizen participation" (interview 18 August 1983). 
Perhaps even more telling, he added: "Citizen participation complaints don't have much 
impact on us. They don't affect E,,hat the council does witfil our budget." 
Community activists echoed this, with complaints about the degree of council 
"interference" with MCDA activities. Several agreed with the sentiments of one 
respondent: ''The city council has tighter control and MCDA is at the mercy of its whims. 
MCDA has no control over its budget." A sympathetic board member elaborated: 
Now I can't vote the way I think best ••. I have to consider that that alderman 
does not like that group and will vote against the budget if I vote to fund it. 
More of the votes are becoming politicized (interview 26 August 1983). 
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TABLE 5. CHANGES IN SATISFACTION WITH CITIZEN PARTICIPATION 
PROCEDURES, BY TYPE OF GROUP 
"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's 
satisfaction with the citizen participation procedures?" 
Satisfaction 
Increased since merger 
Decreased 
Remained the same 
Groups Reporting Links with MHRA 
All Neighborhood 
4 
19 
6 
2 
11 
3 
13.69* 9.3* 
x'2 is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the 
equiprobable distribution. 
*Significant at .05. 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983. 
In sum, while the changes of 1980-82 have not been the unmitigated disaster many 
advocates of citizen participation feared, links between community groups and the city 
bureaucracy have been altered, and the organizations are less than satisfied. Clearly 
critical to a full understanding of that discontent is the Minneapolis City Council, to 
which attention now turns. 
City Council Members and Community Groups 
In the early 1980s, the attitude of key city council members toward citizen groups 
changed with almost breathtaking speed, shifting from fairly supportive to hostile and 
combative. This not only led to the specific council responses already mentioned, but it 
also raised the possibility that an important channel to city government was closing. 
Responses to the 1980 mail questionnaire suggested that citizen organizations were 
most apt· to rely upon council members as access points into the governmental arena. 
Virtually all of the groups surveyed indicated some contact with council members. And, 
there was limited evidence of a "hierarchy of participation." Reports of interaction with 
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governmental actors formed a weak Guttman scale, with links with council members most 
frequent and "easiest," those with HRA commissioners next, followed by ties with city 
staff and the mayor.2 Among respondents to the 1983 questionnaire, over half of the 
groups involved in discussing the creation of MCDA reported contacting council members; 
less than one-fourth communicated with the mayor and even fewer with _state legislators 
or the special task force set up to study the changes. 
The council members responsible for the shift in orientation tended to represent 
poorer, inner city areas. In more than one case, the members themselves originally 
entered politics by way of neighborhood activism. By 1980, however, their support for 
citizen participation had eroded. Participants and observers offered a range of 
explanations. "The groups are beating up on aldermen" (interview 18 August 1983). 
Advocates ~f citizen participatioii} sought decentralization of decision-
making power through the PDCACs... The council resisted... They were 
elected by 20,000 voters as opposed to planning district members who were 
elected by 50-100 people. And PDCACs became a vehicle for opponents to 
build political bases against council members (interview 25 August 1983). 
One of the aldermen involved added: 
These organizations and the outcry about them has little to do with 
neighborhood needs and more actually to do with paid staffers losing their 
jobs ..• [Neighborhoodi) want to keep eating at the public trough (interview 12 
September 1983). 
Regardless of its roots, council hostility triggered a spiral of deteriorating relations 
with citizen groups. As will be seen shortly, community organizations began to work more 
closely with the mayor, sought aid from sympathetic state legislators, and formed a city-
wide coalition of neighborhood groups. Among the primary foci of the Coalition for the 
Defense of Neighborhood Priorities were the 1983 council elections. Although there was 
activity in all the wards, most was concentrated in inner city areas. 
The first systematic foray by citizen groups into the electoral arena, the strategy 
evidently had some impact. As the election approached, some council members joined 
with Mayor Fraser and the MCDA to push for increased funding for community groups 
(Minneapolis Star and Tribune 2 September 1983), a plea to which the full council 
ultimately acceded. And, November 1983 saw the election of five new Democratic 
council members (four incumbents decided not to seek reelection and another was 
defeated). Each had roots in neighborhood organizations and strong citizen group backing. 
Of particular note were two instances in which the local party came head to head with 
community opposition. In the primary, one neighborhood activist unseated an incumbent 
endorsed not only by the ward organization but also by the Democrat mayor, governor and 
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st attorney general. Moreover, she won the contest twice, after a state court voided the 
ty first race because of unfair campaign practices. In a neighboring ward, citizen activists 
'le rallied around the incumbent who lost party endorsement; he too beat his primary 
·s; opponent and won the general election. 
rs Thus, while the relationships between citizen organizations and coun~il members are 
not as amicable as they once were, the hostility evidently has not blocked citizen access. 
nt Indeed, the cuts and changes in structures and procedures may have broadened the scope 
Jy and increased the intensity of group activity, which in turn evidently helped citizen groups 
or reverse at least some of the setbacks. 
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Links with the Mayor 
Community organizations found a much friendlier reception in the office of Mayor 
Donald Fraser. Long an advocate of citizen participation, he vetoed the funding cuts and 
continued to propose higher budgets for community groups, ref erring to the 1980-82 
changes in citizen participation as "the single biggest disaster that has occurred since I've 
been mayor" (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 21 April 1983). 
At the same time, Mayor Fraser's vision of citizen participation does not coincide 
completely with that of many groups. The mayor conceives of citizen groups as 
"communication vehicles, telling communities what MCDA programs are available to 
them. They should pinpoint specific projects and advocate them" (interview 26 September 
1983). Community organizations become service providers and catalysts for particular 
projects. Receiving less stress are potential roles for groups in, for example, interjecting 
broader concerns into public debate or influencing the policies dictating the pursuit of 
particular projects. 
State Legislators 
~gy Finally, links between community groups and state legislators assumed new 
ied visibility. After the initial round of funding cuts, the Coalition in Defense of 
ips Neighborhood Priorities appealed to members of the Minneapolis delegation in the state 
cil legislature to write stronger guarantees for citizen participation into state law. Although 
tic that has not happened, in early 1983, Democratic legislators held several local bills 
,as "hostage." They were released after council members agreed to require inclusion of 
ng. citizen groups in all phases of MCDA's activities. And, at various times, individual 
ith legislators have intervened on behalf of citizen groups in their districts (interview 18 
~nt August 1983; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 12 May 1983). 
md 
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ASSESSMENT 
Several noteworthy changes in the level and character of participation had taken 
place by early 1984. One source of citizen input disappeared with the dismantling of the 
system of advisory groups. More importantly, elimination of staff assistance and funding 
cutbacks evidently reduced citizen capacity to participate in the development process, 
despite formal guarantees. Meanwhile, links with city bureacrats attenuated somewhat, 
and battle lines were drawn with the city council. At the same time, however, community 
groups ultimately persuaded the council to reverse the budget cuts. They also 
strengthened ties with other governmental actors. Furthermore, citizen organizations 
went beyond mere "forum shopping." They also undertook new activities, entering the 
arena of electoral politics and forging links across neighborhood lines. Groups also 
appeared more likely to engage in "adversary" as well as "advisory" advocacy (Sharp 1981 ), 
with the former directed toward enhancing and securing meaningful opportunities to 
engage in the latter. 
In the face of . rather severe environmental threat, one can discern evidence of 
institutionalization in these changes. Citizen groups were able not only to survive as 
organizations but also to maintain access to the policy-making arena. And, this 
adjustment to externally imposed change involved expansion and elaboration of some 
activities as well as contraction and loss of others. Although the situation remains 
unsettled and by no means fully satisfactory, there appears to be little reason to sound the 
alarms over the "virtual wipeout" of citizen participation in Minneapolis. 
GOVERNMENT AL RESPONSIVENESS 
Still, for observers and participants alike, the "bottom line" in assessing citizen 
involvement is its effect on governmental decisions. "Institutionalized" participation 
means little if community groups regularly advise local officials who just as routinely 
ignore them. 
Influence over outcomes is, of course, particularly difficult to isolate. Suitable 
counterfactuals are elusive. What would decisions have been without the involvement of 
citizen groups, or with a different configuration of organizations and strategies? Is the 
existence of outputs consistent with the demands of groups sufficient evidence of impact, 
or the absence of such policy a sure indicator of no influence? 
Below, some tentative conclusions are advanced. At the outset, though, some 
caveats are in order. The sphere of development policy is extremely fluid. Not only may 
findings be transitory, but conventional "objective" indicators of performance are hard to 
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come by. With the creation of MCDA and its inclusion in the city budget process, 
collection and dissemination of a variety of performance measures was halted at least 
temporarily. The discussion, therefore, relies heavily on subjective evaluations garnered 
from the mail questionnaire, interviews and press reports. 
ACCOMPLISHING POLICY GOALS 
First, governmental performance can be compared with "policy benchmarks" 
relevant to citizen groups. One important concern is housing. Yet, success in increasing 
the supply of "affordable" housing has been limited at best. Virtually no change can be 
detected in the proportion of family to elderly residents in public and subsidized housing 
from 1978 to 1983, leaving many poor, minority families unable to find suitable housing 
(Office of the Mayor, State of the City, indicated years). The Minnesota Tenants Union 
argues that only 10 percent of the housing revenue bonds issued by the city in 1981 and 
1982 were used for "affordable" housing (suitable for those with incomes 80 percent of the 
median for the metropolitan area) (Minnesota Daily 28 January 1983). And, citizen groups 
expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of MCDA's marketing of its subsidized units 
(Minneapolis Star and Tribune 20 September 1983). Meanwhile, the privately financed 
Minneapolis-St. Paul Housing Fund (which MCDA administers) made available below 
market rate loans for those with moderate incomes. Project Renovate provided low 
interest loans for major housing improvements. And, in September 1983, policy-makers 
hammered out an agreement to place renewed emphasis on housing rehabilitation 
(Minneapolis Star and Tribune 24 September 1983). 
A second concern of many citizen groups revolves around city efforts to create and 
preserve jobs. However, not only is it hard to gather employment information from 
affected businesses, but assessing which jobs city aid was instru:nental in keeping or 
causing to be created is almost inherently problematical. All that can be advanced with 
confidence is that the study revealed no reports of city interference with employment 
preservation or creation. MCDA began negotiating first source employment agreements 
Wnked to sales of industrial revenue bonds), generating 338 jobs for Minneapolis residents 
in 1983 with as many as 1,500 projected for 1984 (interview 6 September 1983). 
Moreover, Table 6 shows a slight increase in the total number of new jobs created through 
the sale of IRBs. Even so, representatives of inner city neighborhood organizations 
expressed dissatisfaction with the marginal nature of the efforts (Minneapolis Ci~y 
Council, CDC, public hearings 22 August 1983). 
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TABLE 6. JOBS CREA TED THROUGH SALES 
OF INDUSTRIAL REVENUE BONDS 
Calendar Year Jobs Created 
1979 606 
1980 923 
1981 1138 
1982 not available 
1983 1548 
1984 (projected) 1400 
SOURCES: Minneapolis, Office of the Mayor, 
Priorities: The Ma or's Bud et (Minneapolis: 
selected years ; interviews. 
More easily demonstrated is the city's increased emphasis on neighborhood economic 
development. There was virtually no activity in this area until mid-1981. Since then, a 
common bond reserve fund and the Neighborhood Small Business Revolving Loan Fund 
have been created to provide financing to small developers unable to get money at 
feasible interest rates. Neighborhood commercial groups are eligible to receive grants 
from the Neighborhood Economic Development Fund; the fund rose from $350,000 in 1982 
to $680,000 in 1983 (Office of the Mayor, Priorities). While neighborhood business and 
residents' groups as well as MCDA board members spoke favorably of the program, its 
future status is unclear. MCDA requested $550,000 for the fund for fiscal 1984, but the 
mayor recommended only $250,000, and the council approved $245,869. An alderman, 
hedging on his commitment to further funding, described both ongoing and proposed 
projects as "not very impressive" and "quite costly" (interview 26 September 1983). 
Finally, there were some efforts to link economic development and housing 
activities. In 1983, the city council required the developer of a large downtown office 
building receiving city subsidies to construct 100 units of low and moderate income 
housing in a nearby neighborhood (Minneapolis Star and Tribune 18 August 1983). Citizen 
groups responded enthusiastically, but policy-makers refused to commit themselves to 
negotiating such linkages in the future. In general, some groups complained that 
government officials failed to examine the impact on and potential contributions of large 
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development projects to nearby neighborhoods (Minneapolis City Council, CDC, public 
hearings 22 August 1983). 
It is important to underscore, as well, that not all citizen organizations viewed these 
activities with equal enthusiasm. One angry respondent wrote: "In all truth, the 
homeowner has been abandoned, and left to 'go it alone,' while rental properties and flashy 
downtown developments have become the 'hula hoops' for which funds are expended." This 
reflected a more general division between inner city groups advocating policies directed 
at renters and the unemployed, and those in north and northeast neighborhoods who were 
more interested in rehabilitating owner-occupied homes and revitalizing small businesses. 
POLICY DIRECTION 
Raised, in turn, is the question of priorities. Perhaps, despite some limited 
responsiveness, the overall direction of development policy in Minneapolis is turning away 
from that desired by many citizen organizations. 
Certainly, that is the perception of some community activists. In their eyes, large-
scale downtown development is benefiting from increased attention, while neighborhood 
concerns are being neglected. Groups point for evidence to city support for Symphony 
Place, a downtown apartment building (interviews; Minneapolis Star and Tribune 12 
November 1983). Dubbed "Subsidy Place," project developers received tax exempt bonds, 
a $3.6 million federal grant, and $4 million in tax increment funds in return for promising 
to reserve twenty percent of the apartments for lower income people. Yet, the cheapest 
units will rent for nearly $500 per month, requiring a yearly income of more than $15,000 . 
Blame is harder to apportion. Some accuse Democratic aldermen of "selling out." A 
"maverick" MCDA board member is harsher: "Agency staff and the board are pimping for 
developers ••. The council does not have full information" (interview 19 September 1983). 
Not all agree. One representative of an inner city neighborhood group wrote: 
The new director of MCDA .•. has no close ties with private development 
interests. Many of his predecessors at the old MHRA were deficient .•. As a 
result, the Agency's policies tended to favor large, profit-making developers ... 
We find the staff much more responsive. 
In general, however, respondents to the mail survey noted little overall change. 
Agreement with MCDA's actions tended to remain the same following merger (Table 7), as 
did overall satisfaction with the city's development policies (Table 8). Organizations from 
inner city areas were only slightly more likely to express rising dissatisfaction 
(asymmetric lambda = .1, asymmetric uncertainty = .17). 
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TABLE 7. CHANGE IN AGREEMENT WITH DEVELOPMENT AGENCY'S 
POLICY, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP 
"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's 
agreement with the agency's policies and decisions?" 
All Predecessor Agencies MHRA 
All Neighborhood All Neighborhood 
Agreement Groups Groups Groups Groups 
Increased since merger 6 2 4 2 
Decreased 10 4 7 4 
Remained the same 32 11 18 9 
x2 24.5** 7.89** 11.22** 5.2* 
x2 is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the 
equiprobable distribution. 
* Significant at • 1. 
* *Significant at .05. 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983. 
TABLE 8. SATISFACTION WITH DEVELOPMENT POLICIES BEFORE AND AFTER 
MERGER, BY PREDECESSOR AGENCY AND TYPE OF GROUP 
"Since the creation of MCDA, what changes have there been in your organization's 
satisfaction with the results of the development process?" 
All Predecessor Agencies MHRA 
All Neighborhood All Neighborhood 
Satisfaction Groups Groups Groups Groups 
Increased since merger 11 I 4 0 
Decreased 13 5 6 4 
Remained the same 24 12 18 10 
x2 6.12* 10.34* 12.3* 10.85* 
x2 is used to indicate the "goodness of fit," comparing the responses indicated to the 
equiprobable distribution. 
*Significant at .05. 
SOURCE: Mail survey of Minneapolis community groups, 1983. 
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In addition, concerns of citizen groups that the changes of the early 1980s would 
lead to a diversion of government attention from housing to economic development appear 
n's to be unfounded. MCDA officials, for example, evidently strove to balance the two in 
the 
ER 
on's 
the 
setting internal priorities. Inside the agency, the prevailing sense was that housing and 
economic development were inviolable spheres. In interviews, officials had a difficult 
time responding to questions about the relative weight given to economic development 
and housing. One replied simply: 11 (jhetJ operate on different wavelengths (18 August 
1983). And, using allocation of CDBG funds as a barometer of prevailing priorities, little 
change in the proportion flowing to housing and economic development can be discerned 
(Table 9). A planning official cautions, though: "Economic development issues are coming 
to the fore ••. These things take time to change .•• But the shift has taken place in the 
minds of elected officials" (interview 28 September 1983). At least two aldermen agree. 
TABLE 9. ALLOCATION OF CDBG FUNDS, BY DEVELOPMENT FUNCTION 
Economic 
Year Housin Develoement 
percent (percent) 
1980 80 20 
1981 79 21 
1982 87.5 12.5 
1983 75 25 
1984 (agency request) 84 16 
(mayor's recom-
mendation) 86 14 
SOURCE: Minneapolis, Office of the Mayor, Priorities: The Mayor's 
Budget (Minneapolis: selected years). 
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Within each of the spheres, some shifts in priorities can be identified. Again, 
though, none seems to signal a major policy departure. As already mentioned, the city has 
paid more attention to neighborhood economic development (though emphasis is 
declining). However, that emphasis does not appear to be coming at the expense of large-
scale, typically downtown development. Indeed, more prevalent seems t~ be the notion 
that links between the two might be created. 
More change can be detected in the housing arena. There, low income rental, 
moderate income subsidized homeownership and market rate housing programs often find 
themselves juxtaposed, competing for scarce resources. Increasingly, emphasis seems to 
be on the middle category of , "shallow subsidy" programs. Certainly, that is the 
perception of citizen groups in poorer, inner city neighborhoods as well as some members 
of the council (Hult 1983; interview 26 September 1983; mail questionnaire). One should 
not push the conclusion too far, however. In June 1983, for instance, the MCDA budget 
for single family housing programs was cut from $2.3 million to $1.3 million, while that 
for cooperative and rental units increased from $3 to $5 million. Moreover, in 1982 and 
1983, programs for rental and owner-occupied housing received approximately equal 
shares of CDBG monies. In his 1984 budget, the mayor proposed that $3.1 million be 
devoted to rental housing and $2 million to homeownership programs (Priorities 1984 ). As 
in the development realm as a whole, housing priorities are fluid and ambiguous. 
ASSESSMENT 
Government responsiveness to citizen groups, then, evidently did not decline 
precipitously over the period of interest. That is hardly to suggest, though, that citizen 
organizations exercise significant influence over policy decisions. Perceptions that big 
developers benefit at the expense of neighborhood interests abound. Relatively little 
progress has been made toward expanding the volume and improving the quality of low 
income houslng or reducing unemployment. 
Still, as noted at the outset, decision-makers labored under increasing fiscal 
constraints. Perhaps most critically, however, policy-makers seemed both unable and 
unwilling to fix priorities in the development arena and then follow them. For example, 
while the city's comprehensive plan encourages homeownership and stresses increasing the 
supply of market-rate housing, the council has allocated the bulk of CDBG funds to 
programs· for subsidized and rental housing. . The mayor vetoed a proposed policy to 
approve downtown development projects when the developer promises to build lower 
income housing elsewhere in the city, even though he supported such linkage in a 
particular case. Citizen organizations likely contribute to the shifting, sometimes 
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opposing large-scale development, often disagreeing among themselves. To that extent, 
community groups helped shape development policy. Significantly, though, elected 
officials continue to grasp the reins of decision-making rather firmly, insisting on 
frequently exercising direct control in such a high stakes policy arena. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Despite the fears of many, citizen particpation in Minneapolis has weathered 
potentially devastating changes introduced in the early 1980s. The survival of most 
groups and their evident ability to adjust to outside threat by developing new links and 
undertaking new activities suggest that citizen participation has become an "institutional-
ized" part of local politics. Community groups are not just the "mornin' glories" of which 
George Washington Plunkitt spoke so contemptuously (Riordan 1963). And, with 
regularized involvement of community groups, "the {resulting] network structure becomes 
a fact of social existence with which all organizations must contend" (Knoke and Wood 
1981, p. 164). 
Neither, however, have citizen organizations dramatically altered the face of local 
politics. The direction of development policy has changed little. Community groups have 
won key battles, and they have helped keep issues visible (and arguably out of the sole 
control of big developers or large financial institutions). Statutory guarantees, ongoing 
relationships with governmental officials, and the threat of electoral retribution have 
provided groups access to the governmental arena. Yet, once there, organizations for the 
most part continue to react to proposals formulated elsewhere, tendencies heightened at 
least in the short run by reductions in funding and staff assistance. 
One must be wary of extending these conclusions too far. As stressed repeatedly, 
the situation remains unsettled. Moreover, only organized citizen· involvement in the 
arena of urban development has been examined. In other spheres, groups may be more (or 
less) influential. Much of the recent emphasis on regulating pornography in Minneapolis, 
for example, came at the prodding of neighborhood groups. Moreover, by restricting 
attention to "government-focused" efforts by citizen groups, other .significant realms may 
be ignored (see, for example, Hult 1983). And, of course, this study's attention has been 
confined to changes in a single city over a relatively short period of time. 
Despite these cautions, the analysis evidently has implications for organized citizen 
participation more generally. First, it suggests that budget cuts and loss of formal 
mandates need not render community groups powerless. Indeed, external threat may 
trigger and intensify mobilization among citizen organizations. Whether such activism 
can be sustained, however, must remain an open question. 
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Underscored, too, is the importance of the level of organizational skill and 
infrastructure when hostility begins. As Henig contends, a "structural headstart" may 
provide groups with important resources during crises (p. 155). To that extent, the federal 
requirements for citizen participation in the 1960s and 1970s may have lasting impact. 
Yet, while certain organizations (representing perhaps particular sorts o~ interests) will 
survive and possibly prosper, others will have difficulty forming or maintaining 
themselves. And, this will reflect in large part the timing of the "crises." Moreover, 
given scarce resources and resistant government officials, existing citizen organizations 
may be especially loath to see new groups granted access to the decision arena. 
The findings also support the hypothesis that cities' interest in coproduction will rise 
as budgets tighten (Ahlbrandt and Sumka 1983). Clearly, too, the prevailing notions of 
coproduction-held by council members, the mayor, and MCDA officials alike--entailed 
fairly close governmental regulation. Seemingly strengthened are the fears of many (for 
example, Gittell 1980 and Katznelson 1981) that coproduction may transfer the burdens of 
service provision from government to neighborhood organizations with little corresponding 
boost in citizen influence over policy content or direction. 
Highlighted, second, is the continuing importance to community groups of dealing 
with elected officials. "Bureaucratic enfranchisement" (Fainstein and Fainstein 1980) 
of ten may be insufficient as a means for organizations to secure influence over outcomes. 
The critical decisions may have already been made by the time groups prepare to assist in 
service delivery. Furthermore, despite reduced friction between urban administrators and 
citizens (Thomas 1983), bureaucrats may find their attention powerfully directed 
elsewhere--perhaps, as in Minneapolis, to watchful council members with controls over 
funding, legislative authority, and structures and procedures. To the extent bureaucracies 
are more permeable to the demands of elected officials-as they may be expected to be in 
arenas of high stakes and considerable flux and uncertainty--they are likely to be less 
permeable (and thus responsive) to citizen groups. 
Of course, like many council members in Minneapolis, elected officials may be less 
than receptive. And, there need not always be more sympathetic ears, as there were in 
the state legislature and the mayor's office. In addition, though, community groups may 
heighten the visibility and increase the conflict over particular issues, they less often can 
sustain interest long enough to influence overall policy (Stone 1976). Even so, Minneapolis 
organizations succeeded in generating enough controversy that they received some 
concessions. 
Most important, however, examination of the Minneapolis case underlines the 
relevance of the electoral arena. Citizen groups can do more than threaten officials with 
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defeat: they can seek to place their own representatives in office. If, as Stone (1976) and 
Davidson (1979) contend, elected officials tend to be "interest advocates" rather than 
"neutral brokers," then concentrating on electing an "official of one's own" becomes 
attractive. Not all organizations can manage this, but as local parties continue to fade 
and coalitions of citizen groups emerge, the strategy may be increasingly feasible. The 
Minneapolis case also suggests some of its limits. Once elected, new officials are 
introduced to a host of additional pressures and concerns. The steady stream of demands 
from community groups may produce overload and eventually alienation. 
Relatedly, the findings seem to indicate that the utility of mandated input 
mechanisms diminishes as governmental structure becomes more fragmented and/or 
relevant policy arena more fluid. That is, citizen groups may discover they have 
increased influence if, rather than being confined to formal roles, they are able to shift, 
say, between electoral, advocacy and advisory strategies and between mayor, council and 
administrators, as key actors, prevailing influence configurations and primary problems 
change. The existence of mandated advisory groups may divert energy from more 
important tasks or spheres, or make the pursuit of other activities appear less legitimate. 
In contrast, in more stable policy spheres or more closed political systems, such formal 
mechanisms may be more critical in guaranteeing at least some degree of access. Citizen 
groups strive to maintain a precarious balance, seeking to avoid slipping into formal 
cooptation, on the one side, and becoming persona non grata, on the other. Sharp points 
out: 
"Adversary advocacy" may enhance pursuit of "advisory advocacy" provided 
involvement in the former is limited, directed primarily to getting visibility so 
elected officials "take (? grouRJ seriously" ••. without establishing a reputation 
with city officials as a "troublemaking group" (p. 426). 
There is tension from the vantage point of the urban political system as well. 
Institutionalized involvement by citizen groups may increase openness by expanding the 
range of interests and type of participants in the governmental arena. Yet, it also carries 
the risks of balkanizing cities and devaluing the inputs of residents with other interests. 
Council members in Minneapolis did not distance themselves from citizen groups merely 
out of exhaustion or because they had "sold out" to others. Many spoke as well of the 
"parochialism" of community groups and the need to consider the often competing 
concerns of broader constituencies in their wards or in the city as a whole. Exactly where 
an "appropriate" balance is to be struck is perhaps inherently uncertain. But the 
complexities are clear. It is striking to recall that a major complaint of citizen groups in 
Minneapolis is that elected officials have tightened their control over city bureaucrats. 
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The activities and achievements of community groups in Minneapolis pale when 
measured aganst the lofty hopes and cataclysmic fears expressed by advocates and 
opponents of citizen participation in the 1960s. Yet, that era left an important legacy. 
For, though organized citizen participation by no means completely transformed the 
prevailing allocation of public benefits and burdens, it has become a relatively routine, 
legitimate part of local politics, with at least marginal influence over the dynamics and 
outputs of development policy. Moreover, organizations have survived a period of 
relatively severe environmental threat. And, they have adjusted by expanding both their 
range of relationships and their strategic repertoires. The "death knell" for citizen 
participation has not yet sounded. 
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APPENDIX: DA TA SOURCES AND DA TA COLLECTION 
L 1980 
A. Mail Questionnaire 
Questionnaires were sent to 117 groups drawn from an inventory of local 
organizations compiled by the Minneapolis Planning Department in June 1980. 
PDCACs received slightly different questionnaires from the other groups, with the 
surveys for the former more closely tailored to their city-mandated roles. After two 
follow-ups, sixty-nine organizations returned the questionnaire, a response rate of 59 
percent. The distribution of respondents was as follows: 
Type of Group 
Neighborhood 
Citizen 
Neighborhood 
Business 
NSA Committee 
PAC 
PDCAC 
TOTAL 
North 
7 . (18) 
1 (4) 
(2) 
1 (2) 
9 (26) 
North-
east 
Area of the City* 
South 
"Inner 
City" 
Down-
town Total 
6 (8) 13 (24) 13 (20) 39 (70) 
4 (5) 4 (8) 
2 (2) 
1 (1) 
( 1) 4 (4) 
13 (17) 22 (37) 
2 
1 
2 
4 
22 
(6) 3 (3) 14 (26) 
(2) 
(2) 1 
(4) 
( 1) 
3 
4 
11 
(34) 3 (3) 69 
(6) 
(4) 
( 11) 
( 117) 
Entries refer to the number of questionnaires received (sent). 
*Classification by "area" is based on the concept of "community" or ;'planning district," 
designations created by the Minneapolis Planning Department over thirteen years ago. 
The city is divided into eleven communities. The four categories used here combine those 
areas on the basis of demographic characteristics like family income and housing 
condition as well as by the extent of social-cultural "homogeneity" in a particular 
geographic area (see Hult 1983, note 37). 
The poorer response rate from organizations in north Minneapolis (characteristic of 
the 1983 survey as w·ell--see the next section), where most of Minneapolis' small 
black population lives, cautions one to consider the conclusions drawn from the 
survey as tentative. Interview evidence did suggest that groups in this area tended to 
share the views of citizen organizations from other parts of the city. 
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B. Interviews 
Fourteen semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were conducted in 
the spring, summer and fall of 1980. Respondents included neighborhood activists and 
staff in the Housing and Redevelopment Authority and the Planning Department. 
Since they were assured of the confidentiality of their remarks, comments are not 
attributed to specific individuals. 
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II. 1983 
A. Mail Questionnaire 
The mail questionnaire (this time, part of a larger study of the implementation of 
governmental mergers) was sent to eighty-three citizen organizations. Potential 
respondents were selected from a list of organizations registered with the city's new 
Center for Citizen Participation and Communication. Among the respondents this 
time were several "city-wide" groups. Forty-nine of the groups returned the surveys 
(again, after two follow-ups), a response rate of 59 percent, virtually identical to that 
of the 1980 questionnaire. Responses were distributed in the following fashion: 
Area of the City 
North- "Inner City-
Type of Group North east South City" wide Total 
Neighborhood 
Citizen 0 (6) 1 (3) 11 (17) 15 (23) 27 (49) 
Neighborhood 
Business 0 (1) 3 (5) 2 (4) 5 (10) 
Neighborhood 
Social Service 2 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (2) 4 (6) 
Citywide Public 
Interest 7 (9) 7 (9) 
Citywide Business/ 
Professional 2 (3) 2 (3) 
Downtown 
Business 4 (4) 4 (4) 
Citywide 
Racial/Ethnic 0 (2) 0 (2) 
TOTAL 2 (8) 2 (5) 15 (23) 20 (32) 7 (27) 49 (83) 
Entries refer to the number of questionnaires received (sent). 
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B. Interviews 
Seventeen interviews were conducted in the summer and fall of 1983. This time, 
however, more problems were encountered. The executive director of MCDA 
declined an interview, noting a heavy schedule. A vocal city council critic of citizen 
participation also refused an interview as did a labor representative on the MCDA 
board of commissioners. Still, six officials from all but one subunit in MCDA and the 
agency's executive director consented to interviews. So did two council members 
prominent in. the citizen participation debate. Also, among the respondents were 
three MCDA board members, the city coordinator and the mayor and deputy mayor of 
Minneapolis. Two officials from the Planning Department filled out the interview 
list. Again, respondents were promised that their remarks would remain confidential. 
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NOTES 
I. The asymmetric lambda and asymmetric uncertainty coefficient are measures of 
association used with nominal level data when direction of causality can be 
hypothesized. Both are interpreted as the proportion of variance in the dependent 
variable which can be explained by the independent variable. They range between 0 
and 1. See, for example, Reynolds (1977). 
2. The degree of "cumulative participation" was not strong, however; the coefficient of 
scalability was .55, with improvement over minimum marginal reproducibility only 7 
percent. Additional problems are created by having only four items with which to 
construct the scale. On this and interpreting Guttman scales, see Todd (1977). 
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